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1. Introduction 
 
On October 29, 2008, Telenor of Norway announced its plans to enter the Indian 
mobile market. For several years the company had been examining the potential of the Indian 
market, the biggest and most challenging of them all. A window of opportunity opened as the 
telecom ministry in 2008 decided to increase the number of licensed operators from seven to 
fifteen. Defying industry analysts who pointed to the ultra-competitiveness of the Indian 
telecom market, Telenor entered by paying $1.1bn (INR 61.35 billion) for a 60% stake in one 
of the new licensees, Unitech Wireless. Together they launched the Uninor brand.  
Although a significant investment for Telenor, one year before the UK based multinational 
Vodafone had paid $11bn, nearly 10 times as much, for a 67 per cent stake in Hutchison 
Essar, India’s third largest mobile operator. In late 2007 Arun Sarin, the CEO of Vodafone, 
who was born and raised in the country, told the Financial Times (2010) in an interview. “We 
are going to learn as much from India as we are going to take to India. Prices there are two-
and-a-half US cents a minute, and they make a 35 per cent margin. How do you do that?” 
However, two and half years later, Indian tariffs had collapsed, due to fierce price 
competition, to less than one US cent per minute. In May 2010 Vittorio Colao, Mr Sarin’s 
successor, wrote down the value of Vodafone’s business in India by more than 25 per cent, or 
$3.3bn. Vodafone’s difficulties were unique. The revenues of the 15 operators in India’s 
telecoms sector were all under pressure.  
Following its launch in December 2009 in eight of India’s 22 telecom circles, Uninor 
made a strong start. The company racked up 1.3 million subscribers in its first month of 
operation, and continued to capture a higher share of new subscribers than the other 
newcomers as it continued launching services in five more circles. Despite this, revenue did 
not grow in line with business projections. In a highly congested market, price war caused 
rapidly shrinking margins. Panic broke out at Telenor. Something radical had to be done and 
quickly. Here is the story of how Telenor managed to turn around Uninor and put it back on 
the right track again.
1
  
 
  
                                                 
1
 The case draws on documents from Telenor and Uninor. Additionally we interviewed key managers on site in 
Uninor including its COO Yogesh Malik and its CEO (MD) Sigve Brekke in January 2012. In November 2012 
we interviewed the former managing director (MD) of Uninor at Telenor corporate headquarters. 
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2. Background 
The Telenor Group 
Although a newcomer in India, Telenor is far from a newcomer in Asia. The company 
entered the neighboring countries Bangladesh (Grameenphone) and Pakistan (Telenor 
Pakistan) in 1999 and 2005 where it currently hold a number 1 and 2 position, respectively. In 
addition, Telenor has operations in Thailand (DTAC) and Malaysia (DiGi) where they are 
number 2 and 3, respectively. All in all, Telenor has more than 10 years of experience from 
operations in Asian markets.  
The company has also subsidiary operations in a number of European markets and 
through its 31.7% ownership in VimpelCom indirect connections with an additional 20 
countries. With 120 million subscribers in 11 markets and with 2010 revenue of NOK 95 
billion, Telenor is among the world’s 10 largest mobile operators, about one third of the size 
of Vodafone, the world’s largest multinational mobile operator (after China Mobile).    
In 2009 Telenor was used to being an early entrant into its markets and therefore an 
incumbent. It was used to limited competition and used to being able to position its offerings 
to the more affluent members of the countries in which it operated. Its joint venture with 
Unitech in India, Uninor, was to represent a decisive break with this past. 
Unitech Wireless, a subsidiary of Unitech Group, was one of the would-be telecom 
companies that had received 2G licenses in 2008 for all 22 Indian telecom circles. Licenses 
were awarded through a first come-first served process, where eight companies belonging to 
the Unitech Group were awarded telecom licenses.
2
  
In early 2009, the Unitech Group and Telenor agreed to enter a joint venture whereby 
Telenor Group injected fresh equity investments of $1.1bn  (INR 61.35 billion)  into Unitech 
Wireless to take a majority stake in the company. This was fresh operating capital invested 
directly in Unitech Wireless by Telenor. Telenor conducted these investments in four 
                                                 
2
 The method chosen by the authorities to allocate these licenses was later subject to intense controversy as part 
of the so-called “2G scam”. In early 2012 the Indian Supreme Court, concluded an investigation of the license 
distribution that “leaves no room for doubt that everything was stage-managed”. Based on the information made 
available to it, Telenor’s due diligence of Unitech Wirless had been unable to uncover any of this. In early 
February 2012 the Indian Supreme Court withdrew all licenses that had been awarded in 2008 and Telenor had 
to bid for new licenses which were finally awarded in mid-November 2012. Although this period of intense 
uncertainty lies outside the remit of this case the events of 2012 are indicative of the complexity and sheer 
unpredictability of the Indian context that Telenor has had to learn to grapple with.   
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tranches, and subsequent to approvals from the Indian Foreign Investment Promotion Board 
(FIPB) and the Cabinet Committee of Economic Affairs (CCEA) took 67.25% ownership of 
Unitech Wireless. In September 2009, the company announced its brand name as Uninor. The 
name Uninor was composed of the names of the two owners of the joint venture. The 
logotype, font and the visual expression follows that of the Telenor Group and other Telenor 
companies. While Telenor business units operate under the Telenor brand in most markets, 
local aspects and requirements are always considered when deciding upon a brand name. 
Uninor launched its first eight circles on 3 December, 2009, after completing one of 
the world’s largest GSM Greenfield launches which was also one of the fastest telecom roll-
outs ever in India. Six months later, five additional circles were launched including metros 
like Mumbai and Kolkata, making the brand commercially operational in 13 telecom circles 
of India. These circles together account for over 75% of India’s population. 
 
The India Challenge 
Over the last 5-6 years, India has been celebrated as the world’s fastest growing 
mobile market, expanding from 3-4 million subscribers in 2001 to almost 900 million “SIM” 
subscribers by end of 2011. It is important to bear in mind that many subscribers have two or 
more SIM cards which they use according to which one is providing the best deal for any 
particular call.  
By the end of 2009, as Uninor started launching its services, most higher-income 
potential subscribers were already captured by incumbent operators. Despite that the 
incumbents were well established Telenor still considered India to be a very attractive market. 
As the second largest economy in the word and with 50% of its population of 1.2 billion 
people under 25 years of age, Telenor believed that India represented an exciting opportunity. 
This excitement was regarded as fool-hardiness by many industry analysts.  
The onslaught of newcomers following the government issue of new licenses in 2008 
resulted, however, in fierce price competition. The price war hit incumbents as well as 
newcomers very hard. Despite subscriber growth rates of 40-50%, revenue growth seldom 
rose over the mid-single-digits level. This caused incumbents to call for consolidation and 
some newcomers to search for exit and permission to hand back the concessions in return for 
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refund of the license fee. In a note on Vodafone in May 2010, Bernstein Research said: “If 
you were looking for emerging market exposure to mobile growth, India was probably not a 
great choice.” The country, it added, “is a competitive mess, and its regulation grows more 
capricious and nonsensical by the day”. 
For sure, newcomers had stringent requirements placed upon them, designed to ensure 
a prompt rollout of services and to prevent them reselling spectrum at inflated prices. 
Furthermore, spectrum ownership in India is capped, preventing the main players from 
snapping up the smaller ones for their valuable assets. However, the new licensees largely 
failed to meet the rollout requirements applied to their licenses, and by 2010 most were facing 
DoT fines for delayed service launches. Therefore, in the longer run, it was argued that 
consolidation was the only alternative. According to Sanjay Kapoor, CEO of Bharti Airtel’s 
India and South Asia business (reported in Total Telecom (2010:17):  
“Most markets have four to five operators and just the top two or three make money. 
India is a larger market and probably five or six will prevail, but anything over and above 
that is a crowd, and obviously some M&A activity will come to surface the moment [the] 
government liberalizes the stance on it for consolidation to happen.” 
 
3. The Uninor Case 
Initial Entry  
At a press conference in Delhi and Oslo October 29, 2008, Telenor announced its 
plans to enter the Indian market. The entry strategy was worked out by a team of Telenor 
professionals led by Telenor’s CEO Fredrik Baksaas and Telenor’s Asia chief Sigve Brekke. 
The essence of the strategy was to copy the main feature of the already successful operating 
strategies in Thailand and other Asian markets. Important features of this strategy were: 
 hands’ on local distribution  
 high network quality  
 efficient operation  
 high level of transparency  
 flat and lean organization  
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 speedy rollout 
Over and above these features was the notion that Uninor should aim to serve the mass 
market rather than high-end users and do so on the basis of pre-payment rather than post-
payment. 
To lead the local operation Telenor selected one of its most successful Norwegian 
subsidiary managing directors (MDs) who was esteemed for his highly effective and 
successful turnaround of one of the European operations. Rapidly installed at Uninor with his 
management team from his previous operation he was confronted by one hard fact: the notion 
that Uninor should aim to serve the mass market was no more than that. Although Telenor had 
invested in producing a business case for entering India it was arguably incompletely 
specified and therefore open for strategic changes and local adjustments. The size and 
diversity of the Indian telecom market - consisting of 1.2 billion people, 29 languages, 2000 
ethnicities, huge distances, social inequalities, many rival companies, and uncertain 
regulations - was simply too much for one business case. Nor had Telenor had enough time 
and resources to develop more complete business cases covering each of the circles it planned 
to enter. Instead Telenor relied on previous experience and already well-functioning operating 
models developed by sister subsidiaries in neighboring Asian countries, and on the operating 
strength of its Norwegian MD and his European team.  
On the ground in India the Uninor MD quickly decided to depart from the idea that 
Uninor should target the mass-market. Instead he selected to implement a premium services 
strategy. There were seemingly three very sound reasons to do this:   
First, the high ARPU (average revenue per user) that Telenor required from its Uninor 
MD, could most readily be achieved in the premium services, higher-income segment of the 
market.  
Second, although most of the premium service market was already taken by rival 
operators, high level of churn still offered an opportunity to capture a substantial part of the 
market.  
Third, it was precisely the premium services strategy that was being recommended by 
the highly influential consultancy company McKinsey which had been hired to assist in the 
implementation phase.   
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Delegating to the local MD the responsibility for getting the strategy of the operation 
into place was part of the DNA of Telenor.  Indeed adjusting – however radically - the 
strategy to how local conditions were perceived on the ground was precisely what the Uninor 
MD was supposed to do. That is not to say that he did not have a local board to answer to but 
that board was supportive. Furthermore, as Telenor CEO Fredrik Baksaas’ first choice to head 
up the Indian operation, the Uninor MD had the full support of the top management of 
Telenor in making a decision that was supported by the members of the highly competent and 
well-functioning management team he had brought to India with him.  
With Ericsson as its equipment supplier and Indian Wipro as its IT partner Uninor 
manned its operation and achieved a record fast rollout. Thus within ten months of arriving in 
one of the world’s most competitive mobile telephony markets Uninor’s first MD and his 
team were up and running. The question was would its premium services strategy prove to be 
the right strategy. Like any strategy the definitive answer to that could ultimately only be 
determined post-implementation. If it was not the right strategy that would raise other 
fundamental questions about Telenor: how quickly is it capable of early-recognition of 
strategic failure and to what extent does it have the capabilities to engineer a swift turn-
around?  
 
Premium strategy 
Uninor launched its first eight circles on 3 December, 2009, after completing one of 
the world’s largest GSM greenfield launches which was also one of the fastest telecom 
rollouts ever in India. Six months later, five additional circles had been launched including 
metros like Mumbai and Kolkata, making the brand commercially operational in 13 telecom 
circles of India. Together these circles account for over 75% of India’s population. A set of 
financial targets were announced for the new venture such as reaching an 8% pan-India 
market share by 2018, breaking even on EBIDTA within three years of launch and obtaining 
positive operating cash flow within five years of launch. The operational peak funding 
requirement was set at INR 155 billion. 
With its first MD at the helm, Uninor pursued a "premium position" strategy just as 
Telenor had done in most of its other foreign markets: i.e. a high level of customer service; 
choice of plans; comprehensive presence; and high-end VAS services (but not streaming). 
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The brand was built around an ambition to serve the young, aspiring India, using emotional 
messages to stimulate growing consumption of premium services.  In terms of Figure 1 
Uninor had positioned in the top left quadrant alongside the long established Indian national 
champion, Bharti Airtel. 
 
Figure 1: Uninor’s initial strategy. 
 
However, Uninor’s late entry as greenfield operator combined with severe entry 
barriers, created serious problems for making this strategy work. By the end of June 2010, 7 
of the 15 operators accounted for 96% of the India’s 636 million mobile subscribers, “leaving 
the newcomers to battle it out for the scraps” according to Total Telecom (2010) a daily 
newsletter. With a subscriber base of zero and unoptimized network coverage across 13 
circles, Uninor was literally dwarfed by giant incumbents like Bharti and Vodafone with a 
subscriber base of 75-100 million and unmatched network coverage across all of India’s 22 
telecom circles. Distribution channels were losing confidence, retailers wanted additional 
commission to accommodate Uninor services, and rising pressures from leading media houses 
did not make things better. With a premium service offering and a market positioning strategy 
that did not differ significantly from the market leading incumbents, the Uninor campaign 
gradually lost momentum.  
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Turnaround 
Declining growth under cut-throat price competition with established rivals created 
acute need for radical change. The Uninor MD, however, considered declining growth to be 
more of a normal downtime event following massive service launching, and decided to stay 
the course. After all, Uninor had just launched having completed the fastest and most 
successful rollout ever in the Indian mobile market. Telenor Asia chief Sigve Brekke was of 
another opinion. As the more Asia-experienced of the two, Brekke read the signals from 
leading media, distributors, retailers, subscribers and competitors differently. Revenue did not 
improve. After recurrent but unsuccessful attempts at changing the strategy, Telenor CEO 
Baksaas decided to intervene. After 18 grueling months in India Uninor’s first MD and his 
entire team were moved back to Norway to be replaced by a new cost-focused management 
team headed by Telenor’s long-serving Asia chief, Sigve Brekke.   
Telenor central management also decided to fully support the new management team’s 
radical turnaround initiative. In strategic marketing terms, this implied converting the 
company’s approach from segmented marketing of premium services with a primarily 
emotional appeal (“solving your communication needs”) to mass marketing of basic local 
services with a purely rational appeal (“providing you with the best basic local services to 
lowest price”). In terms of Figure 1 Uninor moved from the top left quadrant to the bottom 
right.  
In the fall of 2010 the tagline ‘baat mein dum hai’ was introduced to reflect this radical 
shift in strategy to a basic services and a mass market approach. The tagline emphasizes 
Uninor’s ‘value for money’ position, and is further emphasized by simple, clear and light-
hearted advertisements where functional product benefits are evident to the audience. In more 
general terms, Uninor’s low-cost strategy implied targeting the special need of most Indian 
customers for low-priced reliable basic local services and then tailoring the company’s value 
activities accordingly. 
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Low-cost strategy 
Top management at Uninor started communicating to employees their low-cost 
strategy by introducing three clear-cut strategic objectives. Uninor was to be:  
 best on basic local services (voice and sms) 
 best on mass market distribution 
 best on operating costs.  
At every company gathering these objectives were repeated until they had been 
memorized by employees. They were a means not only of telling employees what Uninor was 
trying to achieve, but also what it was not aiming to do.   
Uninor also developed a “winning every day” mantra. This was far from being empty 
words. At corporate headquarters in Gurgaon all sales figures are monitored on a daily basis 
in what is known as the Uninor “war room”. These sales figures can be broken down at any 
level and they are used to set daily targets for distributors of its SIM cards. Thus a feature of 
Uninor is one of extreme transparency. Another feature of Uninor’s systems is that it can 
swiftly identify high value customers (the 25% who account for 75% of its revenues) who are 
decreasing their use of Uninor’s services. A locally translated text message is automatically 
triggered to provide an enticement to return to Uninor.     
In cost saving terms, the three objectives meant: getting rid of all unnecessary costs in 
network operation, IT services and distribution; and exploiting remaining capacity through 
radical outsourcing and cost sharing with other market players.  
For example, to enhance utilization of networks and IT systems, Uninor decided to 
concentrate base stations to high traffic areas and outsource operation of network to Ericsson 
and IT systems to Wipro (applying their innovative “Transformational Partnership” model, 
see below).   
 
Network operation 
To lower its network operation costs, Uninor pursued the same type of radical 
outsourcing of network infrastructure as pioneered by Bharti, thereby achieving rapid capacity 
scaling at lowest possible costs. With a more recently rolled out infrastructure in place, 
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Uninor operates one of the most modern GSM networks in the country. Uninor’s modern 
equipment has enabled it to introduce targeted offerings and serve a large audience with 
limited spectrum, further enhanced by its IT-partner Wipro (see below). By moving base 
stations out of low traffic into high traffic areas (cluster optimization) and applying the 
network utilization method developed by Dr. S. Hariharan  (VP Networks of  UP West), 
Uninor managed to squeeze significant more capacity out of their mobile network than any of 
their competitors. In addition, by working closer with their equipment supplier Ericsson on 
network optimization and utilization methods, Uninor expects to enhance capacity and reduce 
operating costs even further.    
 
IT-services 
Like its rival Bharti, Uninor chose to outsource IT-services which allowed it to target 
its service offerings and optimize its spectrum usage better. But, unlike Bharti, Uninor 
decided to invite their favorite IT-provider Wipro to work much closer with them than anyone 
had practiced before. Initially, Wipro was highly skeptical of such a closely integrated, 
ambitious initiative. Gradually, however, Uninor managed to convince Wipro to accept the 
gain sharing conditions of the partnership model. The model worked successfully. By 
developing smarter IT solutions in close collaboration with Uninor IT staff and under joint 
project management, Wipro IT engineers managed to reduce the number of IT service 
personnel dramatically.  Besides, by focusing insistently on simplification, Wipro helped 
Uninor avoid making other operators’ most common mistake of letting their IT architectures 
develop into increasingly more complex and costly-to-operate structures. The outsourcing 
deal implied that ownership of all IT equipment was transferred to Wipro. The gain sharing 
agreement implied sharing the resultant cost saving of which Uninor received 75% and Wipro 
25%, thereby taking the concept of outsourcing to “the next level”. As such, Uninor’s 
“transformational partnership” model for the Indian market represented a radical break not 
only with standard Telenor practice, but also with telecom conventions more generally. 
 
Mass distribution 
To avoid head-to-head competition with incumbent operators, Uninor decided to 
abandon distributors who offered competing products and services and developed a network 
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of Uninor exclusive distributors instead along with an extensive network of "C" and "D" level 
retailers. These retailers or points of sale (POS) were "Mom & Pop shops" selling a wide 
variety of products and services. Besides Uninor products these shops also sold competing 
offerings from other mobile operators. Numerous retailers were supplied with Uninor 
products and services (SIM cards, subscriptions, recharges, special offers, etc.) by a 
comprehensive network of field sales agents supervised by the above mentioned Uninor 
exclusive distributors, using technology-enhanced equipment and techniques – some for the 
first time in India.  
It works in the following way: Independent distributors that operate under exclusive 
agreement with Uninor buy SIM cards from Uninor and resell these to numerous small POS 
for a commission using a comprehensive network of sales agents (Retail Sales Executives 
(RSEs). Each RSE deals with 50-60 POS which sell SIM cards to phone users for a 
commission. Additionally there are Key Account Managers (KAMs) who operate in a similar 
way to RSEs except that they deal with a much smaller number of larger retailers. Unlike its 
competitors Uninor has designed its system in such a way that POS cannot sell SIM cards to 
other POS thus maintaining “distribution hygiene”.   
The commissions at each stage of the distribution chain can only be used as a kind of 
Uninor currency that enables sellers to buy more SIM cards, subscription and recharge 
products. When these products are sold to the next stage in the distribution chain, 
commissions are turned into cash. Unlike its competitors Uninor’s POS are not dependent on 
receiving payment from the distributors. Commission on sales is immediate, transparent and 
predictable. That is not always the case in regard to its competitors. Uninor views this as 
constituting a competitive advantage. 
A particular feature of the Uninor human resource model is that the RSEs and KAMs 
are directly employed by employment agencies such as Manpower and Adecco who offer 
medical insurance and a certificate of employment. In other mobile operators their equivalents 
are employees of the distributor who may be tempted to under-pay and to recruit sub-standard 
employees. REMs and KAMs are trained and hired by Uninor (thereby operating as a kind of 
house consultants). Another exclusive feature of the Uninor model is that RSEs can have a 
career leading to direct employment by Uninor. High performing RSEs may be promoted, 
first to the position of KAM, then to Territory Sales Executive (TSE) who are directly 
employed by Uninor, and finally to the positions of higher level sales or business managers.  
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By end of 2011, Uninor was represented through a mass market of over 400,000 points 
of sale, 7000 sales agents (RSEs and KAMs) and 1,700 distributors across 13 circles, serving 
36 million subscribers.  
Uninor’s distribution chain is a unique asset in the Indian market and represents as 
such a potential source of competitive advantage over other newcomers. It may even represent 
an advantage over incumbents such as Bharti Airtel and Vodafone in the competition for the 
poorest customers at “the bottom of the pyramid”. All other operators, incumbents as well as 
new entrants, rely on independent distributors with their own field sales force without the kind 
of seamlessness characterizing Uninor’s distribution chains. These more distant operators, 
separated from their field sales force and without the ability to monitor and influence the 
efforts of sales agents the way Uninor does, must rely on market pull instead to drive sales. 
This may work fairly well for large incumbents with high coverage and esteemed brands, but 
not for new entrants lacking similar coverage and brands. To compensate for their 
disadvantages, new entrants therefore need to implement a correspondingly effective push 
model capable of convincing customers about the relative benefits of the Uninor offer. So far, 
Uninor is the only operator in the Indian market that has developed such a highly effective 
push model.  
 
Subscribers  
Through capacity based pricing (e.g., peak hour charging, dynamic pricing, price 
optimization, and LUT zoning) customers are incentivized to utilize the network in a more 
optimal, and mutually beneficial, way. For example, dynamic pricing offers the customers 
super-low call charges in return for placing their calls at times and places where there are 
excess capacities in the network. By responding to such price incentives, customers may 
contribute both to reducing the investment in excess capacity to handling peak traffic and to 
increasing the utilization of such capacity, thereby lowering the average cost per voice minute 
(cpm) significantly. Like Ikea, that offers their customers lower price on furniture in return for 
doing part of the assembly themselves, Uninor offers their customers lower price on phone 
calls in return for utilizing their scarce network capacities better. As the first mobile operator 
in India, Uninor introduced Dynamic Pricing, a concept that gives consumers discounts that 
are based on current network traffic at an individual site and change with location and time. 
About 40% of Uninor’s customers are on a Dynamic Pricing plan. 
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  Uninor organization and management 
Consistent with its cost leadership strategy, Uninor cancelled all costly development 
activities for half a year and focused on building a “super lean” business model. This implied 
executing a painful cost cutting program whereby 600 of its total 2.600 employees were 
forced to leave. This caused anxiety among remaining staff. Those who remained had to come 
to terms with that the premium telco they had joined was now to be a low-cost provider. In 
many of their minds low cost was tantamount to low competence. Many of these were young 
professionals motivated not just by salary or status but also by Uninor's Scandinavian "flat 
structure". Uninor now had to convince employees that low cost operations would yield high 
growth which would enhance their value. Uninor MD Sigve Brekke played the leading role in 
communicating the importance of tailoring all possible value activities to deliver ultra-low-
cost basic services. To execute this he used every major occasion to (1) remind the company’s 
employees of the company’s threefold strategic objectives concerning basic services, 
distribution and costs, (2) emphasize the kind of trade-offs that need to be made and the 
activities that need to be prioritized to execute the low-cost strategy (3) tighten the fit among 
activities along the value chain, from upstream network optimization to downstream service 
marketing via its RSE/KAM based distribution system. By the end of 2011 a new confidence 
among employees was being developed. However, the annual attrition rate was still about 20 
percent.  
 
4. Preliminary Effects  
 
Gradually, Uninor started to improve, capturing an increasing share of net additional SIM 
customers and growing their revenue and market share without much extra costs. At the end 
of 2011 Uninor is a half billion $ company. With impressive 34% in net additions in October 
2011, Uninor is currently performing far above its main incumbent rivals Bharti and 
Vodafone with only 12-13% in net additions. Hence, its ambitious goals of (a) capturing 8% 
of the Indian market by 2018 and (b) turning EBITDA positive by end of 2013 at an expected 
traffic volume equal to one third of the current break-even volume of their leading local 
competitors, seems increasingly attainable. Although Uninor had above or close to 6% market 
share in four of its 13 circles for June, and close to 8% in some of these for November (not 
shown), there are significant improvement potentials in others, mainly in the south.     
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Figure 2. Uninor subscribers  
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Source: Information Note to the Press (Press Release No. 57/2011). TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
OF INDIA. New Delhi, 8th December, 2011 
 
Figure 3. Service providers’ share in net additions during the month of October 2011 
 
5. Learning Implications 
 
The income pyramid of India shows that majority of the Indian population is at the bottom 
of the pyramid.  
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Source: NCAER-CMCR 2010 annual income data. 
Figure 4. The income pyramid of India 
 
Thus as Uninor shifted its strategy it had to develop extremely low cost products to 
engage these customers. A prerequisite for this was to reinvent its cost structures.  
Prahalad and Hart (2002) argue that this cannot be achieved by fine tuning standard 
approaches. Rather, the entire business process must be rethought with a focus on 
functionality. Looking at the turnaround of Uninor, we can find most elements of such 
reinvention of cost structures. 
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Traditional Model Uninor Model 
 
Traditional supply structure 
 
Revenue based supply structure 
 
Outsource or managed service model where 
an average Telenor business unit had been 
leveraging on partner eco-system. 
 
 
Transformational partnership model with 
efficiency gain sharing (innovative operating 
models and process focus). 
Supply chain partner model: 
 
Collaboration oriented partner model: 
 
Source: Presentation by Yogesh Malik at NHH (16-09-2011) 
Figure 5.  A Comparison of the Uninor business model with the traditional business model 
 
However, it is not set to get easier for Uninor. India is sharply divided between the rural 
poor and the urban rich. This is reflected in the price paid for mobile-telecoms spectrum. “In 
the 2010 auctions for 3G telecoms licenses, operators bid ten times more for a slice of the 
airwaves in affluent Dehli, with 18m people, than in east Uttar Pradesh, with 120m people” 
(Economist, 2011). In 2001 there were 600m active subscribers in India. However, as many of 
these were the rural poor usage levels were generally low. In September 2011 Sunil Mittal, 
the boss of Bharti Airtel, declared that the extra cost of servicing rural low-usage customers 
was making things unprofitable.   
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Prahalad and Hart (2002, 1) may argue that “The real resource of market promise is not 
the wealthy few in the developing world, or even the emerging middle-income consumers: it 
is the billions of aspiring poor who are joining the market economy for the first time.” 
However, operating at the bottom of the pyramid means efficiencies of a kind not associated 
with developed markets. This raises the question of whether the rest of the Telenor group, 
particularly its operations in the Nordic countries has much to learn from Uninor.  
 
Uninor 
In huge emerging markets like the Indian mobile market, there are probably two 
workable operator strategies, one premium “top-of-the-pyramid” strategy, and one low-cost 
“bottom-of-the-pyramid” strategy. Under the premium strategy, a large number of potential 
high-income customers, but a relatively small portion of the total population, are offered 
premium services at relatively high prices. Under the low-cost strategy, a much larger number 
of potential low-income customers, and a much larger share of total population, are offered 
basic services at very low prices. As the Uninor case illustrates, turning a low-cost “bottom-
of-the-pyramid” strategy profitable, requires an operator that is not only capable of running its 
own specialized value chain at highest level of efficiency, but also capable of running 
connecting value-chains jointly with external partners (upstream service providers and 
downstream distributors and retailers) at similar level of efficiency. This is a demanding task 
and requires a kind of close quasi-integrated collaboration similar to the one obtained by 
Uninor’s transformational partnership model. To achieve this, the strategic priorities, 
resources and capabilities of a low-cost operator need to be highly specialized and focused on 
its extended low-cost value-chain, effectively sheltered from the competing priorities, 
resources and capabilities of a premium services operator.  Combining the two strategies in 
the same company requires developing an ambidextrous company capable of pursuing both 
strategies. This is hardly possible without creating two separately organized units, but how 
separately depends on the remaining potential for activity sharing and skill transfer. 
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Telenor Group 
Uninor’s COO Yogesh Malik argues that Uninor's experience with low-cost strategy 
can be of relevance to the rest of the Telenor group. He draws a parallel with Pepsi that 
regards the Indian market as an arena for learning how to become a low-cost operator. 
Besides, by making the “bit pipe” more effective the way Uninor did, Telenor would be much 
better prepared to fight the “Data Battle” in the future. However, Malik concedes there will be 
resistance to adopting such insights around the Telenor group. Obviously, Uninor’s ultra-low-
cost “bottom-of-the-pyramid” business model is more applicable in low-income Asian and 
African countries than in high-income European markets. Some best practices and operating 
principles though might still be relevant for high-income European markets and transferable 
to premium services providers in these markets. Among these we may include techniques and 
principles associated with network optimization, transformational partnership and seamless 
distribution.  
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Appendix 
Key milestones prior to turnaround:  
 29 October 2008: Telenor announces its plans to enter the Indian mobile market at a press 
conference in Delhi and Oslo 
 19 February 2009: First management team of Unitech Wireless is nominated, with Stein-
Erik Vellan as managing director 
 15 June 2009: Unitech Wireless office moves to its new premises in Gurgaon 
 4 September 2009: Mumbai hub  office  opened 
 7 September 2009: First roaming agreement signed, with Digi in Malaysia 
 19 September 2009: Unitech Wireless is renamed Uninor and is branded as part of the 
Telenor Group 
 30 September 2009: Uninor is 1000 people strong. Ravi R Rao joins as 1000th employee in 
Karnataka Circle 
 15 October 2009: Bihar team achieved 121 BTS site integrations on a single day 
 22 October, 2009: Tamil Nadu network team completed 2000 BTS installations in exactly 
100 days 
 3 December 2009: Uninor launches commercial mobile services in 7 circles, reaching up to 
600 million people 
 22 December 2009: Uninor launches its commercial services in the Orissa circle. 
 8 January 2010: Unitech Wireless received the third tranche of equity investment from the 
Telenor Group 
 2 February 2010: Uninor receives fourth and final round of equity investment from the 
Telenor Group. The Telenor Group takes ownership to 67.25%, as per the shareholders’ 
agreement. 
 7 April 2010: Uninor gets the Most Promising New Operator in the Telecom Operator Award 
2010 organized by tele.net 
 30 April 2010: Uninor launches Dynamic Pricing in the three circles of Tamil Nadu, 
Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh 
 4 May 2010: Uninor launches Unlimited Plan 
 16 May 2010: Network infrastructure hits 20,000 integrated base transceiver stations (BTS) 
 2 June 2010: Uninor launches commercial mobile services across 5 circles - Maharashtra & 
Goa, Mumbai, Gujarat, West Bengal & Kolkata. 
 30 July 2010: Sigve Brekke, Head of Telenor Asia, is nominated as Managing Director for 
Uninor. 
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On October 29, 2008, Telenor of Norway announced its plans to enter the Indian 
mobile telecom market. Despite a strong start, revenue did not grow in line with 
business projections. In a highly congested market, price war caused rapidly 
shrinking margins. Something radical had to be done and quickly.  A new cost-
focused management team, headed by Telenor’s Asia chief Sigve Brekke, was 
appointed. In record time, they managed to turn Uninor into a dedicated ultra-
low-cost basic services provider for the mass market, based on optimized net-
work capacity in 13 of India’s 22 telecom circles. This was made possible by the 
utilization of an innovative “Transformational Partnership” model that combines 
radical outsourcing of information technology (IT) services with deeply integrated 
relational contracting for such services.  As such Uninor’s new operating model 
for the Indian market represented a radical break not only with standard Telenor 
practice, but also with telecom conventions more generally. Gradually, Uninor’s 
results started to improve, with a prospect of turning EBITDA positive by end of 
2013 with an expected traffic volume equal to one third of the current break-even 
volume of the leading incumbent.
